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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conditional Sales-Vendor's Right to Possession
Before Default.
A recent North Carolina case1 involved the retaking of an auto-
mobile by the vendor under a conditional sales contract. Brogden,
J., speaking for the court, says that a conditional sale is in effect a
chattel mortgage; and that "the law confers upon the mortgagee the
right of possession which he may exercise before or after de-
fault. . . ." The clear import of this statement is that the vendor
in a conditional sales contract has the right to possession before de-
fault, as in the case of a chattel mortgage.
A conditional sale and a purchase-money chattel mortgage are
used for practically the same purposes. Even the forms are hard to
distinguish. These facts alone would cause confusion in placing the
various transactions in one or the other of the two categories. More-
over, when this field of the law was developing, most states required
chattel mortgages to be registered but had no such provision con-
cerning conditional sales.2 This added to the confusion since the
courts, in order to protect innocent third parties who had relied upon
the appearance created by possession, resorted to strained construc-
tion to bring the transaction within the class requiring registration. 3
North Carolina had its share of this confusion and conflict 4 until
endorsement been lacking or expressly restricted to a guarantee of "genuine-
ness" of prior endorsements.
Furthermore, while it is recognized that this is not a sale, a pertinent
analogy can be drawn in the field of sales. Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y.
198 (1872) (vendor will not be permitted to say that he does not intend what
his warranty explicity declares); Smith v. Hale, 158 Mass. 178, 33 N. E.
493 (1893) (purchaser may examine article himself and at the same time take
warranty from vendor); Tennessee Roofing Co. v. Ely, 159 Tenn. 628, 21
.S. W. (2d) 398 (1929) (as to latent defects the buyer may take and enforce
an express warranty notwithstanding the fact that he has personally examined
the goods) ; see also 1 WILLIsToN, SALES, (2d ed. 1924) §208.
The double security of warranties and personal inspection may be desirable
for several reasons. Oak Lawn Sugar Co. v. Sparks Bros. Mule Co., 159
Mo. App. 496, 141 S. W. 698 (1911) (purchaser realizes his liability to mis-
taken judgment); Brown v. Matthews, 14 Ala. App. 428, 70 So. 287 (1915)
(existence of some special knowledge on the part of vendor).
'State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S. E. 63 (1933).
" 203 N. C. at 832, 167 S. E. at 64.
2Young v. Phillips, 202 Mich. 480, 168 N. W. 549 (1918) ; Ballew v. Smith,
32 N. C. 176 (1849).
' Tague v. Guaranty State Bank of Drumright, 82 Okla. 197, 202 Pac.
510 (1921).
' Ashe, J., says in Frank v. Hillard, 95 N. C. 117, 119 (1886) : "We have
had a good many cases before this court like that presented by the record in
this case, and there has been some conflict in these decisions which we find
it difficult to reconcile."
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the passage of a statute in 1883 requiring conditional sales to be reg-
istered in the same manner and with the same effect as chattel mort-
gages. 5 That is, in order for a vendor who had retained title by way
of security to assert this title against innocent purchasers, the title-
retention contract would have to be registered. But the legislature
declared no intention of abolishing the distinction between conditional
sales and chattel mortgages.0
However, the language in the instant case is applied to facts that
involve neither a question of registration nor a policy of protecting
innocent third parties. The controversy here is between the original
parties to the transaction. Neither this statute nor decisions under
this statute would apply. Therefore, the question of the right of
possession under a conditional sale contract before default would
depend upon the normal construction given such contracts.
It is almost universally held that the transfer of possession and
the right to possession before default are essential elements of a con-
ditional sale.7 The very purpose of this kind of transaction is to
give the purchaser the use of the property while it is being paid for.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides that "the buyer shall
have the right when not in default to retain possession of the
IN. C. CoDE Axx. (Michie, 1931) §3312.
IBrem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191 (1885), seems to be the first case in-
volving this statute. There is no intimation in that case that the distinction
between conditional sales and chattel mortgages had been abolished. In Tufts
v. Griffin, 107 N. C. 47, 12 S. E. 68, 10 L. R. A. 526 (1890), the court de-
cides that as between the parties a given transaction amounts to a conditional
sale and does not mention a chattel mortgage.
However, in more recent cases the court has intimated that the two trans-
actions were the same. Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 120,
58 S. E. 909 (1907) ; Sta ndard Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C. 481, 90
S. E. 564 (1916). In Harris v. S. A. L. Ry. Co., 190 N. C. 480, 130 S. E.
319, 49 A. L. R. 1452 (1925), the court says that to all intents and purposes, the
title retaining contract is a chattel mortgage. But the case only decided
that one who negligently injured a chattel held under a registered con-
ditional sale contract could settle either with the vendee in default or the
vendor and that a settlement with one precluded recovery by the other.
'First National Bank v. Marlow, 71 Mont. 461, 230 Pac. 374 (1924);
Phelen v. Stock Yards Bank, 134 Okla. 13, 276 Pac. 175 (1928); Kingland
Plow Co. v. Joyce, 194 Mo. App. 367, 184 S. W. 490 (1916); Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co. v. Anderson, 190 Iowa 439, 180 N. W. 273 (1920); Defiance
Machine Wks. v. Gill, 170 Wis. 477, 175 N. W. 940 (1920); Young v. Phil-
lips, 203 Mich. 566, 169 N. W. 822 (1918).
See also (1929) 13 MINK. L. REv. 247, which says that a vendee under a
conditional sales contract has two rights, that of possession, and that of ac-
quiring title.
See contra: General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Goldboges, 260 Ill. App.
474, 481 (1931).
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goods ... .,,8 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Tufts v. Grif-
fin,9 which was decided seven years after the passage of the con-
ditional sales recordation statute, states that the vendee has a right to
the "actual legal and rightful possession" with a right to the title
upon payment of purchase price; and further, that the "vendor
could not interfere with possession 'until a failure to perform con-
dition.'"
Therefore, it appears that the court in taking one type of trans-
action and placing it in the category of another transaction, then giv-
ing it all the attributes of this other transaction-a dangerous pro-
cedure at best-has adopted a theory which cannot be supported by
direct authority in our own or in other jurisdictions.
WILLIAM MEDFORD.
Constitutional Law-Protection of Rights Acquired in
Reliance on Overruled Decision.
A significant factor in the change and growth of Anglo-American
law is the overruling of prior judicial decisions. The overruling
process, though unquestionably salutary in the course of time, en-
genders immediate difficulties. One of these difficulties-the adjust-
ment of acts done and rights vested in reliance on the decision over-
ruled-faced the United States Supreme Court in the case of Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co.1
The Supreme Court of Montana, in Doney v. Northern Pacific
Ry. Co.,2 had indicated a certain procedure to be followed by shippers
in suits against carriers to recover overcharges for freight. Plaintiff
in the Great Northern case, in bringing suit against defendant car-
rier, had followed the procedure indicated in the Doney case. On the
appeal of the Great Northern case to the Montana Supreme Court,
that tribunal held that the rulings of the Doney case were erroneous,
and would not be followed in the future, but that nevertheless they
'UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALEs Acr §2. See (1922) 2 ORE. L. REv. 1 for
discussion of the scope of the purpose of this act.
'Supra note 4. See also Whitlock v. Lumber Co., supra note 6, at 126,
58 S. E. at 911, where the court quotes with ipproval from 3 CENT. L. J. 413
as follows: "There is no doubt but that title and the right of property by
the terms of the note remained in the seller while possession and right to pos-
session were in defendant (buyer)." This was in the absence of a specific
provision in tie contract as to which party was to have possession.
1 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 53
Sup. Ct. 145, 77 L. ed. (Advance Opinionj) 173 (1932).
"Doney v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 209, 199 Pac. 432 (1921).
